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CONCLUSION
Although the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit character-
ized the New York law as a minimal infringement on the precious
freedom of association and the right to vote, the reasoning behind sev-
eral federal district court cases dealing with comparable, more restric-
tive statutes would seem to call for a contrary interpretation of the effect
of New York law. The compelling state interest test for determining
whether restrictions on fundamental rights are unconstitutional requires
that the state interest furthered by the legislation be a compelling one,
that the statute carry the burden of justifying the restriction, that the
restriction be necessary to promote the interest, and that the classifica-
tion be precisely tailored so that the lines of exclusion correspond almost
exactly with the exclusions necessary for achievement of the legislative
goal. The Second Circuit apparently diluted the compelling state inter-
est test, for it ignored the requirement that the classification be precisely
tailored. It found the restriction necessary to achieve the state's interest
in preventing raiding even though it was not clear that raiding consti-
tuted a significant problem or that much less restrictive means might
not suffice to deal with whatever danger was present. In view of the
development of the compelling state interest test and its recent applica-
tion to durational residency requirements for voting, restrictions on the
right to vote in primary elections cannot be conditioned upon the length
of time since the voter switched his party registration or voted in another
party's primary. The right to vote, whether in a general or primary
election, ranks among the most cherished rights of our democratic sys-
tem. Without strong evidence that raiding represents a serious threat to
the integrity of the electoral process, no state can justify denying a
citizen's fundamental constitutional right to vote in a primary election
solely because he participated in the nominating procedure of another
party for a recent prior election or within a specified period of time.
NORMA S. HARRELL
Constitutional Law-Cognovit Notes: Pretrial Waiver of Constitutional
Rights in Civil Cases
In D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.1 and its companion case, Swarb
192 S. Ct. 775 (1972).
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v. Lennox,2 the Supreme Court examined the constitutonality of cog-
novit clauses for the first time in nearly seventy years.3 In Overmyer
the Court affirmed the constitutionality of cognovit clauses in arm's
length contracts between economic equals although it indicated that it
might find the same clauses unconstitutonal "where the contract is one
of adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargaining power, and
where the debtor receives nothing for the cognovit provision." 4
Recent criticism of cognovit clauses stemmed from concern that
unsophisticated consumers who accept cognovit provisions in credit ar-
rangements forfeit their constitutional rights to notice and a hearing
prior to judgment without benefit of due process of law.' In Overmyer,
the Court has indicated that the constitutionality of cognovit clauses
signed by individual debtors will depend on the validity of the waiver of
rights in the particular cognovit clause.' If the constitutional rights were
validly waived when the contract was signed, then a judgment filed later
without notice to the debtor is secure against charges of denied due
process.
The waiver rationale, previously applied in two lower court cases,7
should silence criticisms of cognovit procedures if the courts enforce
that approach stringently by applying a strict presumption against waiv-
ers and by enforcing the criminal definition of waiver in cognovit cases.8
The facts of Overmyer passed muster as a valid waiver of rights
292 S. Ct. 767 (1972).
'National Exch. Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257 (1904); Grover & Baker Sewing Mach. Co. v.
Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890). These are the most recent cases in which the Supreme Court
examined cognovit notes.
'92 S. Ct. at 783. As will be developed, not every such clause necessarily need be found
unconstitutional.
'Id. at 778 n.4.
'Several writers and one state court had suggested that cognovit waivers of the rights to notice
and hearing could never be valid. See Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 232-33, 250
N.E.2d 474, 482, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382, 393 (1969); Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Prob-
lem of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 111, 141-43 (1961); Note,
Cognovit Judgments: Some Constitutional Considerations, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1126 (1970).
But see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent,
375 U.S. 311 (1964). Overmyer is possibly distinguishable from Ezrine in that consent to jurisdic-
tion was limited to the state of Ohio under the Ohio statute, whereas the Pennsylvania statute in
Ezrine placed no limit on possible jurisdiction. 92 S. Ct. at 777 n.l. See also Justice Douglas'
dissent. Id. at 784.
7Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971); Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091
(E.D. Pa. 1970), affd on other grounds, 92 S. Ct. 767 (1972).
aln crim ,n I cases a waiver of constitutional rights must be demonstrably knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938).
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under the strictest of standards, so the Court declined to decide whether
it would countenance standards less strict than those applied in criminal
cases. Grounds for justifying lower standards for cognovit waivers were
suggested when the Court noted that waiver of constitutional rights in
civil cases "parallels the recognition of waiver in the criminal context
where personal liberty, rather than a property right, is involved." 9
The distinction between criminal and civil cases, however, is no
basis on which to erect different standards of waiver of constitutional
rights. Indeed, if an approach less rigorous than that outlined above is
taken in cognovit cases, the protections for cognovit debtors will be lost
just when they were recognized, and the criticisms of denied due process
will be resurrected.
PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN
COGNOVIT CASES
In the past the Supreme Court has not hesitated to apply a strict
presumption against waiver of constitutional rights in the civil context. '
Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy," in which the Court declared that it
would "indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" to pro-
tect a civil party's right to jury trial,'2 is perhaps the strongest statement
of the position.
There is no justification for a retreat from that policy in favor of
cognovit procedures which waive the due process rights to notice and a
hearing prior to judgment. Recent cases have left no doubt that these
rights are considered the bedrock of due process in civil as well as
criminal proceedings.' 3
Furthermore, different standards of waiver should not rest on the
distinction between personal and property rights in criminal and civil
cases because the fourteenth amendment guarantees personal rights and
property rights equally in terms that suggest no basis for distinction.
The purpose of property rights, as much as personal rights, is to secure
individual liberty and independence from dominance by the govern-
'92 S. Ct. at 782.
"Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S.
408 (1882).
"301 U.S. 389 (1937).
121d. at 393.
"See National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964); Mullane v. Central
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Wuehter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
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ment.11 In the words of Professor Reich:
[P]roperty performs the function of maintaining independence, dign-
ity, and pluralism in society. . . The Bill of Rights also serves this
function, but while the Bill of Rights comes into play only at extraordi-
nary moments of conflict or crisis, property affords day-to-day protec-
tion in the ordinary affairs of life. Indeed, in the final analysis the Bill
of Rights depends upon the existence of private property. Political
rights presuppose that individuals and private groups have the will and
the means to act independently. But so long as individuals are moti-
vated largely by self-interest, their well-being must first be indepen-
dent. Civil liberties must have a basis in property, or bills of rights will
not preserve them."5
Thus personal rights and property rights serve the same important end.
They are equally guaranteed by the Constitution because they protect
equal values. Since this is so,there is no basis for a distinction between
personal and property rights which would justify different presumptions
against waiver in criminal and civil cases. Speaking of the "conceptual
difficulties created" by such a distinction relating to federal jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court said recently in Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp.,6 "[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property
rights is a false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights."
Thus the Court should continue to indulge every reasonable pre-
sumption against waivers of constitutional rights, whether the waiver
occurs in criminal or civil cases.
STANDARDS OF WAIVER IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES
Johnson v. Zerbst'7 is generally cited as defining the standard for
waiver of constitutional rights in criminal cases. In that case the Court
held that a waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right."18 The precise language used in Zerbst was borrowed
from civil law. The same words had been used for at least a century to
describe the standard for express waivers in contract law, 9 and the
"See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 92 S. Ct. 1113 (1972); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
"Reich, supra note 14, at 771. Professor Reich also demonstrates how it has come to be
"widely thought that property and liberty are separable." Id. at 772.
92 S. Ct. 1113, 1122 (1972).
17304 U.S. 458 (1938).
"Id. at 464.
"Hoxie v. Home Ins. Co., 32 Conn. 21 (1864); cf. Clark v. West, 193 N.Y. 349, 86 N.E. 1
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elements of knowledge and intent have characterized definitions of
waiver generally for an even longer period."0 In every legal context,
waivers have been thought to comprise knowledge and intent as a matter
of elementary definition."1 In criminal cases since Johnson v. Zerbst,
very stringent concepts of both knowledge and voluntariness have devel-
oped in order to protect against waiver of rights where personal liberty
is at stake.22 The same concepts, for the same reasons, would apply to
cognovit waivers.
Knowledge. A criminal defendant is not held to have knowingly
waived his rights unless he was aware that he had those rights and he
understood the consequences of his waiver. A cognovit debtor merits no
less protection, for any standard of fairness is offended if constitution-
ally guaranteed rights are surrendered by mistake or because the unwary
consumer (or defendant) did not comprehend their importance.
Whether personal or property rights be forfeited as a result of the waiver
should be immaterial.
Voluntariness. Recent criminal cases culminating in Miranda v.
Arizona" stress the necessity to protect individual dignity as well as
freedom by refusing to countenance compelled confessions (i.e., invol-
untary waivers of the right to silence). Criminal courts are thus alert to
invalidate forced waivers on grounds of psychological as well as physical
compulsion. The specific impetus for this development has been a fear
of the potential for compulsion inherent in police confrontations against
criminal defendants.2 4
The cognovit debtor, it might be said, confronts not an arm of
government power but his creditor, a private citizen who cannot in
theory assert any compulsion over a customer in a free market. Since a
creditor cannot force assent to a cognovit note in the same way the
police can force confessions, it might be argued that the strict standard
of voluntariness in criminal cases is unwarranted in the civil context.
However, the preservation of individual freedom demands that we
protect property rights as jealously as we do personal liberty.25 The
(1908); Cowenhoven v. Ball, 118 N.Y. 231, 23 N.E. 470 (1890); 28 AmI. & ENG. ENC. LAW
Waiver §§ I, III (1896); M. BIGELOW, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL 506 (1st ed. 1872).
"Darnley v. London, C. & D. Ry., L.R. 2 H.L. 43 (1867).
2 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1751 (4th ed. 1951).
22See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
-384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
"Id. at 448-58.
2See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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power of commercial interests in consumer markets where adhesion
contracts are common, threatens to abridge individual freedoms just as
government power may. When the courts attach property on the basis
of confessed judgments, commercial power is impossible to distinguish
from governmental power."
Furthermore, there is great potential for compulsion in dealings
between parties with disparate bargaining power. A consumer con-
fronted with a "take-it-or-leave-it" adhesion contract in a market in
which all creditors require the same cognovit waivers before extending
credit has no choice but to adhere to the creditor's terms if he must buy
on credit. Thus a strict standard of voluntariness, the equal of that
utilized in criminal cases, should be enforced by courts considering the
validity of cognovit clauses if the rights of the debtor are to be ade-
quately protected.
APPLYING STRICT STANDARDS OF WAIVER TO COGNOVIT NOTES
If the courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waivers,
under what circumstances will creditors be able to demonstrate valid
cognovit waivers by the strict criminal standards? Can closing proce-
dures be devised which will satisfy these standards and preserve the
commercial utility of cognovit notes?
Knowledge. Lower federal courts have invalidated cognovit provi-
sions on the failure by creditors to demonstrate a knowing waiver in two
recent cases .2  Both courts, however, indicated that acceptable proce-
dures for demonstrating a knowledgeable waiver could be devised. 21 A
briefing procedure similar to that required by the Truth in Lending Act 9
26See generally Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1969);
Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1072 (1953); Kessler,
Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629
(1943); Reich, supra note 14,
2Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971); Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091
(E.D. Pa. 1970).
2 Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349, 1360 (D. Del. 1971); Swarb v.Lennox, 314 F. Supp.
1081, 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1970). See also id. at 1098, in which the court apparently condones closing
procedures utilized in connection with execution of mortgages. Notice cannot be waived in those
cases, however.
"Consumer Credit Protection Act §§ 121-31, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-1641 (1970). Essentially the
act requires:
(a) Disclosure, to make the consumer aware of the consequences of his act;
(b) Acknowledgment-the consumer must sign a separate document attesting his un-
derstanding; and
(c) Period of rescission, during which the consumer may renege on his contract.
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or a requirement for an examination by a notary could rebut the pre-
sumption against a knowing waiver in ordinary cases without destroying
the commercial utility of cognovit procedures.30
Voluntariness. Proof of voluntariness by the strict standards pres-
ents a much more difficult problem that the courts have yet to face. A
mere briefing procedure would be ineffective to dispel doubts about the
effect of economic compulsion on a cognovit debtor.
If there is disparate bargaining power between debtor and creditor,
under what conditions will adherance by the debtor to the terms of an
adhesion contract be considered voluntary? In such a situation, an impe-
cunious consumer dealing with a large creditor who offers a form con-
tract containing a cognovit clause demonstrably adheres voluntarily if
reasonable alternative choices were open to the consumer but were re-
fused by him. Thus, if the creditor is offering substantially the same
terms as a competitor who does not require assent to a cognovit provi-
sion, it would appear that the consumer has a realistic choice between
sellers so that his waiver could be considered voluntary. The reasonable-
ness of the choice would be determined in view of the particular circum-
stances of individual cases and the extent of the burden on the consumer
to know of other creditors' terms. This sort of case-to-case factual
determination might make cognovit clauses commercially unfeasible in
consumer transactions.
But what of the small consumer in a market in which all creditors
impose cognovit clauses in installment contracts for the purchase of a
given item? At the outset the consumer's choice is whether to make his
purchase at all-to take it or leave it. This choice might be sufficient to
render a waiver voluntary for the purchase of luxury items but not for
the purchase of necessities. It seems manifestly unrealistic to argue that
a person purchasing necessities on an installment contract voluntarily
assents to a cognovit provision when such provisions are required by all
creditors in the market. The consumer has no reasonable option to
refuse to buy necessities at all, and, if he is poor, he may have no choice
other than to buy on credit. He must make his credit purchase, and he
cannot do so without waiving his rights in assent to a cognovit provision.
The choice to buy even luxury items should not hinge on waiving consti-
tutional rights; the presumption against waiver should not be overcome
by judicial evaluations of a consumer's prudence in his purchases. The
"But see Note, Confessions of Judgment in Pennsylvania: Halway to Oblivion?, 32 U. PITT.
L. REv. 236, 244-49 (1971).
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distinction between luxury and essential would be nearly impossible to
define for contemporary consumers.31
Recent federal cases dealing with distraint procedures imposed in
adhesion leases have determined without hesitation that assent to such
provisions in a crowded housing market cannot be considered volun-
tary." "There is no freedom of contract-there is merely a freedom to
adhere . . . -33 In the cognovit area, however, the Osmond court
refused (without any discussion) to find involuntariness on such
grounds. 4
Even so, if the courts continue "to indulge every reasonable pre-
sumption against waiver," cognovit clauses utilized in situations of dis-
parate bargaining power and adhesion .contracts should routinely be
presumed involuntary.
Closing Procedures. In adhesion markets, then, how might credi-
tors defeat a presumption against voluntary waivers yet retain a com-
mercially feasible cognovit procedure? Clearly the simple signing of a
contract containing a cognovit provision would not establish a valid
waiver. Separate affidavits attesting the waiver and signed by the con-
sumer might suffice to establish that a waiver was knowing, but it is
difficult to see how they could guarantee voluntariness since the nature
of the choices open to the consumer would not be altered by an affidavit,
and a ruling on such a fact situation would likely require a decision by
a judge.35
A possible solution may be suggested by the Court's implied criti-
cism in Overmyer of the situation in which "the debtor receives nothing
for the cognovit provision."'" The cognovit procedure is commercially
useful to creditors because it eliminates the expense of notice and hear-
ing in the case of defaulting debtors. Perhaps creditors could specifically
determine the worth of confessions of judgment and could offer debtors
the option of including or excluding cognovit provisions with correspon-
ding differences in price. The choice between prices would have to be
reasonable and the burden of demonstrating knowledge or understand-
ing would remain. In such a case, the parties would have bargained for
"See Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1998-99 (1972).
"Sellers v. Contino, 327 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Santiago v. McElroy. 319 F. Supp.
284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
"Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
"1327 F. Supp. at 1358.
"Note, 32 U. Pirrr. L. REV., supra note 30, at 244-49.
1192 S. Ct. at 783.
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the cognovit provision, the debtor would have a choice between reasona-
ble alternatives, and, if he waived his rights, he would receive an identifi-
able value for his waiver.
CONCLUSION
Cognovit procedures are not unconstitutional per se because the
due process rights to notice and hearing prior to judgment may be
validly waived. If a strict standard of waiver is applied and if a presump-
tion against waiver is maintained, the heavy burden on creditors to
establish a valid waiver may well destroy the commercial utility of
cognovit notes in small consumer transactions. If the burden is placed
on the creditor to demonstrate a valid waiver in a hearing to reopen
judgment, a confession of judgment would be of less use to the creditor
than ordinary judgment procedures, in which he can rely on default
judgments to keep his legal expenses down. The cognovit creditor would
be forced to gamble that the facts of the particular case could establish
the validity of the waiver in order to be certain of a valid judgment. This
would be an equitable burden on the creditor. Cognovit procedures are
undeniably legitimate and useful commercial devices in arm's length
dealings between corporate parties. In disparate bargaining situations
there is a great potential for unfairness and exploitation. If a heavy
burded is placed on creditors to demonstrate the efficacy of the debtor's
waiver, commercial expediency will determine that creditors only em-
ploy cognovit provisions in appropriate circumstances. A creditor sim-
ply could not afford to execute a confessed judgment not validly ob-
tained if the debtor, armed with strict standards of waiver, can so easily
reopen the judgment.
EDWARD C. WINSLOW III
Constitutional Law-Evidence-No Testimonial Privilege For Newsmen
From the time the issue of a newsman's first amendment right to
withhold information was first raised,' attorneys and newsmen eagerly
awaited a ruling on the question by the United States Supreme Court.
'Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). All previous
attempts were based on common law claims. See, e.g., People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y.
291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911).
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